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Chapter 6 
Ritual and Rightness in the Analects 
Hagop Sarkissian 
Li fl and yi ~ are two central moral concepts in the Analects. 1 In classical 
Confucianism generally, and in the Analects in particular, Ii has a broad semantic 
range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of 
personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that 
the Ii comprise strictures of correct behavior. The Ii are a distinguishing character-
istic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and 
protocols that were thought to constitute the wise practices of ancient moral 
exemplars filtered down through dynasties of the past. They constitute the core of 
the Analects ethical practice, and are importantly related to other moral concepts 
such as humankindness (ren 1=),2 filial devotion (xiao zJ=) and reverence (jing ~). 
However, even while the li were extensive and meant to be followed diligently, 
they were also understood as incapable of exhausting the whole range of activity 
that constitutes human life. There were bound to be cases in which one would either 
be unfamiliar with the relevant Ii, cases in which more than one Ii would seem to 
apply, or cases in which no rule of li would apply. As part of their reflections on the 
good life, the Confucians maintained another moral concept that seemed to cover 
morally upright behavior in these types of situations, where there was no obvious 
recourse to the li. This concept is that of yi or rightness. 
In what follows, I will begin with a brief historical sketch to provide some 
context for the discussion that follows, and will then consider li and yi in turn. In the 
end, I will suggest how Ii and yi were both meant to facilitate the supreme value of 
social harmony that pervades much of the Analects and serves as its ultimate 
orientation. 
1 Translations of passages from the Analects in this chapter are the author's own. 
2 See Chap. 5 in this volume for more on the relationship between ren and li. 
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Background: The Ru and Rituals 
There is a strong historical connection between the Confucians and ritual. While 
this historical connection is not directly of philosophical interest, exploring it (even 
briefly) will help to provide some context to explain why the notion of Ii ended up 
playing such a central role in Confucian social, moral, and political philosophy. 
Confucius and his circle of companions and students were members of the ru 11, 
a class of individuals that were charged, historically, with carrying out important 
court and clan functions. The ru had a particular expertise in the Ii - here under-
stood as the rites, formal ceremonies, and other formal procedures of the nobility. 
Indeed the root meaning of Ii refers to such formal cultural rites as funerals, 
banquets, or sacrificial offerings of sheep at the first of the month (3.17). The Ii 
were understood to be different during different eras, such that Confucius could 
speak of the Ii of former dynasties like the Xia I, Shang lffi and Zhou JWJ, 
suggesting that they were different across these eras (2.23); Confucius laments 
that there are no records of the Ii of the Xia and Shang dynasties (3.9). The ru 
studied the Ii alongside other disciplines such as music, archery, poetry, and history 
(see, e.g. 16.5, 16.13, 17.21). 
We see this expertise in numerous passages. For example, a regular refrain in the 
text concerns deviations from ritual form. Consider the extensive criticisms of the Ji 
* family, one of the Three Families (Ji-sun, Meng-sun, and Shu-sun) that had 
usurped power from the descendants of the decaying Zhou royal lineage. Confucius 
balks at the Ji family employing eight rows of dancers (3.1), performing the yong 
ode during sacrifice (3.2), and making a ritual trip to Mount Tai (3.5), seeing in all 
of these a usurpation of the former king's and feudal lords' ritual prerogatives. 
Confucius himself believed that deviance from proper ritual fonn was a harbinger 
of social decay and disorder (16.2). Throughout the text, we find Confucius 
criticizing changes in details of ritual such as where and when a person must bow 
and what material is appropriate for ceremonial garb (9.3), and what length of 
mourning is appropriate after the death of one's parents (17 .21 ). Indeed, some of the 
rituals had decayed so much that Confucius himself would rather not witness them 
(3.10) and his students openly wondered whether one should bother with them at all 
(3.17). Given their expertise, such detailed observations should come as no surprise. 
It's clear, then, that the Ii were a source of great preoccupation for the 
early Confucians. Some have taken the ubiquitous discussion of Ii as signaling a 
primary or overriding focus. According to such interpretations, the early ru were a 
tightly knit group of individuals interested almost entirely in mastering the formal 
songs, chants, and dances that comprised these rites and ceremonies, and were 
uninterested in other goals such as social or political reform (see, e.g., Eno 1990). 
However, while the Ii were indeed weighty and central to Confucian concerns 
(as we shall see below), the term itself refers to much more than formal rites and 
ceremonies. What's more, the role of the Ii was much greater than upholding details 
of received cultural tradition. Over time, many members of this group of 
individuals-the ru-would come to have concerns that extended far beyond 
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their roles as ritual masters. Beyond maintaining and perpetuating the rites, the ru 
would seek social and political reform. Part of their core conception of how to 
reform society was to have it shot through with observance of Ii. And just as the ru's 
concerns were themselves broadening, so too was their conception of the nature and 
extent of Ii. The aim of those undertaking Confucian educational training was to 
become exemplary individuals known as junzi or noblemen, persons of moral and 
cultural distinction who could reform society, lead by moral example, and thereby 
restore harmony. 
Out of this background the Confucian discourse on ritual grew and expanded, and 
with the erosion of ritual their reflections on its role in social and moral life became 
more rich and sophisticated. In what follows, I will trace the role of Ii starting with its 
importance in early childhood development, and continue through its ceremonial and 
ethical aspects, finally concluding with a discussion of Ii in government. 
Ritual and Family Life 
When MENG Yizi ••r asks about filial devotion (xiao), Confucius says "Don't 
disobey." Moments later, Confucius clarifies bis comment to another companion, 
FAN Chi f!:11: "When they're alive serve your parents according to Ii, when they 
die bury them according to Ii, and sacrifice to them according to Ii." (2.5). The Ii are 
meant to stipulate norms of conducts across a wide range of human relations, so 
there are Ii that apply to family relations which must be followed strictly. But why 
are the Ii so important? A crucial reason for this concerns the role of the family in 
shaping the moral life of a child. 
Much of one's early life is spent in the company of one's family. They play a 
vital role in cultivating one's learned reactions and propensities, and honing one's 
social and moral faculties. One's earliest preferences and dispositions, cares and 
concerns, likes and dislikes, are all shaped profoundly by one's familial environ-
ment. Consider, for example, that one's foundational moral experiences are likely 
to occur under the supervision and guidance of one's immediate family members. 
Children first acquire emotions in concrete episodes during childhood when parents 
or older siblings attend to the natural, biological reactions in the child and provide 
these reactions names keyed to the concurrent scenario, teaching the child that it is 
experiencing a particular emotion (de Sousa 1987, 2001). During such episodes, 
one is taught by one's family what is appropriate to feel in a wide range of specific 
roles. The family is likely the first unit to introduce one to normative notions such as 
correctness and appropriateness, what one is expected or permitted to say and feel 
in a wide array of social roles and situations. This will occur through constant 
correction and intervention, encouraging certain attitudes and behaviors while 
censuring others. Much of this will, of course, consist of rote learning and imitation; 
a child cannot be expected to have the insight or understanding of a mature 
moral agent, so strict compliance (without understanding) is necessary at the 
outset (cf. Cua 1996; Lai 2006). Nonetheless, in learning these roles and 
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expectations---even in rote ways-norms of moral correctness become part of one's 
psychological fabric, forming the basic dispositions and patterns of reflection and 
response that will color the rest of the person's moral growth (Sarkissian 2010a). 
Since the Ii constitute society's received wisdom concerning exemplary forms of 
conduct in particular roles, demanding strict compliance with the Ii not only shapes 
the emotional life of the child but also instills habits of personal comportment that 
reflect exemplary forms of conduct. 
Consider, too, that families are naturally hierarchical and divided into particular 
stations and roles. The family mirrors how Confucians understand rituals function-
ing in social life-----delineating norms according to social roles. The parent/child 
dyad is perhaps the most obvious of these relational roles, yet all family members 
were related to one another in strict ways. Children and parents, wives and 
husbands, older and younger siblings---each of these represents particular relation-
ship dyads with attendant duties, obligations, and spheres of influence. Parents and 
elder siblings have obligations to nurture the younger members of the family, yet 
these younger members must be devoted and obedient in tum. Early family educa-
tion includes the crucial dimension of learning family roles, where the child learns 
not only his own but also those of others he or she interacts with, such as parents, 
older siblings, and elders of the community, along with the duties, attitudes, and 
benefits that accrue to each individual according to their own particular position. It 
is precisely in the context of such clearly delineated roles that li can be expected to 
be articulated, stipulating how individuals ought to relate to one another. 
Families thus prepare one to enter society with an understanding of oneself as 
always being related to others in determined ways, as an individual nested in 
networks of relationships governed by Ii and requiring certain excellences of 
character (Sarkissian 2010c). Ishani Maitra, writing about the function of etiquette 
and propriety generally, has noted that early childhood education in such strictures 
of correct behavior is largely aimed toward their accessibility-that is, to make 
them second nature. 
A rule is highly accessible for a particular group in a given context if members of that group 
tend to apply the rule automatically, without conscious reflection on its appropriateness or 
usefulness. Some rules may generally be more accessible than others; and some may be 
more accessible in certain contexts than in other contexts. One reason to suppose that rules 
of etiquette are highly accessible, at least for some individuals, is that these are rules that are 
often taught from a very early age. (Maitra 2004: 200). 
When Confucius tells FAN Chi that being xiao means behaving according to the Ii, 
then, we can understand this as one instance of the general way that the Ii were 
meant to delineate proper conduct in relational roles. The Ii of the family help one to 
occupy one's place in society; a filial son, having properly observed the Ii and 
internalized them, will not defy his superiors (1.2), and will have the same reputa-
tion within the family as without (11.5). Some people said of Confucius, "Why did 
he not participate in government?" Confucius said, "What does the Book of 
Documents say of filial devotion? 'Be filial, be only filial/Be a friend to your 
brothers/You will be an asset to those governing.' [Being filial] is participating in 
government. Why this 'participate in government'?" (2.21). 
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Rituals as Sacred Rites 
The li covered a diverse range of activities, among them formal religious rites. By 
engaging in formal rites linked to significant life moments (such as mourning rites, 
wedding rites, and sacrifices to one's ancestors) one can develop deep emotional 
connections with other individuals and foster a feeling of reverence for the spiritual 
dimension of human existence. The linkage between observing ritual and 
cultivating emotions such as humility and deference in the text is patent and 
undeniable; rituals require an emotional "presence" (3.12, 3.26), and emotional 
authenticity trumps procedural formality (3.4, 17 .11). 
But how are rituals connected with these emotions? Do ritual instill the emotions 
themselves? Or are emotions fostered in some other way? Philip Ivanhoe represents 
a standard way of interpreting the role of ritual when he writes that "one was not 
fully following the li until one performed each ritual with the appropriate attitude, 
but one could only develop these attitudes by practicing the Ii" (Ivanhoe 1990: 25). 
But how, exactly, does ritual develop the attitudes and emotions that are so central 
to ritual participation? One might think that rituals (or ritual procedures) themselves 
foster the feeling-that the particular gestures, incantations, or sequence of events 
of ritual ceremonies would evoke the appropriate emotions in the participant. 
Indeed, something about particular ritual forms was thought to be incredibly 
important and profound (e.g., the Di sacrifice mentioned in 3.11), and there is a 
marked bias against deviation from orthodox ritual form throughout the text. 3 
(Similar sentiments are expressed toward music and orchestration, which is 
championed in its orthodox form and denigrated in its heterodox form, e.g., 
15.11, 17.11, 17.18). 
However, ritual forms themselves cannot be sufficient to elicit the emotions. It's 
clear in numerous passages of the Analects that the Ii could be observed without any 
emotional presence at all. Consider, for example, the infamous exchange between 
Confucius and his exasperating student Zaiwo $3t, who protests against observing 
the traditional 3 year mourning period for his deceased parents (17.21). Zaiwo 
believes the lengthy, barren, and relatively solitary lifestyle demanded of mourners 
would hinder their educational practices, and might even lead them to lose ground 
in their studies of ritual and music. Shouldn't 1 year-the completion of the natural 
four season cycle-be enough? Confucius responds that if Zaiwo would feel at ease 
ending the mourning period and returning to normal life after 1 year, then he should 
do so. It seems as though, in this instance, the feelings are lacking and so the ritual is 
meaningless without them. We can also infer that the barren and simple mourning 
lifestyle would not be sufficient to make Zaiwo feel a greater sense of loss for his 
parents. 
If ritual forms are not sufficient to foster the emotions that are so often cited 
in conjunction with them, how to rituals bring forth emotional development? An 
answer is suggested by Bryan Van Norden, who defines rituals as "learned human 
3 See the section on Ritual and Flexibility, below. 
100 H. Sarkissian 
activities that is regarded as sacred" (Van Norden 2007: 102). Following Emile 
Durkheim, he notes that an important aspect of such sacred rituals is their indepen-
dent authority or force, which practitioners themselves inject into the rituals. 
Because ritual is seen as sacred, it is regarded as having an authority that is not reducible to 
that of human individuals. This raises the question of what it is for something to be 
"sacred." To regard something as sacred is to think that the proper attitude toward it is 
awe or reverence. (Van Norden 2007: 102). 
Rituals are supposed to be approached with a feeling of reverence, and this feeling 
of reverence in turn imbues the ritual with a kind of sacred authority. Put another 
way, without one's own emotional commitment the ritual will itself lack the 
characteristic feeling of reverence. The reverence is rooted in the feelings brought 
to the ritual by the participant, who must be taught what feelings are appropriate for 
the ceremony. While the ceremony itself must be well suited to evoking the 
emotions it is meant to express (for example, solemn music for mourning, festive 
music for celebrations), the practitioners must themselves infuse it with the requi-
site emotional presence. Rituals are likened to a coloring or decorating on top of a 
clean, pure foundation; they come after the emotions, not before (3.8). First comes 
knowledge, virtue, dignity, and this is perfected through ritual participation (15.33). 
A novice might not feel any deep emotions during ritual participation. However, 
over time and with the encouragement of teachers, family members, and other ritual 
participants, the individual can be taught to foster the emotions for the ceremony. 
Rituals require coordination and cooperation amongst individuals who will be 
participating in various capacities, and such participation can foster feelings of 
community and co-dependence. Rituals demand from each participant appropriate 
commitment and spirit, lest the ritual itself fail to exemplify the feelings and 
attitudes associated with it. Over time, the ceremony, the individuals, and the 
emotions become intrinsically connected. At this stage, the ceremony itself may 
seem to demand or literally wrench the emotion from the participant, fostering 
feelings of humility and deference to it. According to Van Norden, it is this 
authority of ritual-this transcendence-that allows rituals to maintain and 
strengthen ties within a community. 
[A]s we participate in an external order maintained by human agency yet characterized by 
sacrality, we internalize values expressed by that order. This is, I take it, part of the force of 
[Confucius's] comment that, "To overcome oneself and to turn toward the rites is to 
become humane" (12.1). In other words, humans are originally resistant to ritual, so one 
must "overcome" one's original self and "tum" around, tum toward ritual. (Van Norden 
2007: 111-112) 
Ritual Propriety, Personal Restraint, and Decorum 
Van Norden focuses on holy rites-rituals that must be regarded as sacred and 
approached as such. As mentioned at the outset, the Ii refer to a broad range of 
nonns of conduct from formal ceremonies to more general strictures of proper 
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behavior. Consider, for example, a handshake. This is certainly a kind of ritual, and 
was offered by Herbert Fingarette as a modem Western analogue to Confucian 
ritual propriety-something similar to bowing which, in Confucius's time, would 
certainly count as Ii behavior (Fingarette 1972). Indeed, such standards of proper 
behavior were also captured by the Ii, and such standards could cut across a wide 
range of life situations quite distinct from sacred ceremonies. The Ii thus character-
ize how one ought to conduct oneself with regards to general demeanor and overall 
decorum. Herbert Fingarette finds this a distinguishing characteristic of 
Confucius's teachings, that he uses "the language and imagery of Ii as a medium 
within which to talk about the entire body of the mores, or more precisely, of the 
authentic tradition and reasonable conventions of society." (Fingarette 1972: 6). 
When we submit to ritualized demeanor and decorum, we do so out of a desire to 
signal to others that they are within the scope of our moral concern, that we 
acknowledge them as meriting consideration and respect. Observing the rites in 
everyday exchanges can be considered a "formal enactment of respect for the 
community, its tradition, and its members," whereby we "forestall conflict, misun-
derstanding, disorientation, and surprise, protecting ourselves and each other from 
shame and insult" (Haines 2008: 478). To comport oneself according to the li in the 
presence of others signals that one cares. Refusing to do so, or neglecting to do so, 
signals the opposite-that others are not worthy of one's moral attention. 
The overall cohesion and cooperativeness of a society will hinge upon the 
success of the innumerable small interactions of its individual members. The 
Analects emphasizes the importance of conduct in such microethical situations, 
which are frequently occurring situations in everyday life in which the stakes are 
seemingly low but in which there are nonetheless potential conflicts of interest 
between the individuals involved.4 Microethical situations are often strategic in 
nature-that is, the outcomes for each person involved depends on the actions of the 
others. (Think about finding a parking spot, or waiting in line at the bank, or 
accidentally bumping into a distant acquaintance at a local store, or deciding how 
to divide up menial tasks at the workplace: these are all mundane sites of potential 
conflict.) It is precisely in these everyday interactions that one must regulate oneself 
and try to exemplify an excellence reflecting the spirit of ritual. 
It's likely that when philosophers think of morality and ethics, they do not often 
think of these kinds of situations, which do not seem to reflect morality's impor-
tance and seriousness. For Confucius, though, these situations are the very basic and 
essential stuff of moral life, where one's comportment and style can exert tremen-
dous influence on others (Kupperman 2002; Olberding 2007). It is one's conduct in 
close contact with particular people in everyday situations that is of paramount 
importance to constructing a thriving society where individuals and their interests 
are fulfilled in effortless fashion. 
We can understand the importance of the outcomes of such microethical 
situations through the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies (Sarkissian 2010b). 
4 My usage of the term microethics is indebted to Adam Morton (Morton 2003). 
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In any social exchange, when we approach one another, we signal to one another 
our values, commitments, and intentions through our demeanor, facial expressions, 
and tone of voice. This happens even before we start talking; our overt behavior will 
trigger certain emotional reactions in others, making certain responses from them 
more likely to occur than others; a respectful demeanor will make it more likely that 
others act favorably toward us, whereas a stem demeanor might make them reticent 
or defensive. Once such emotions are activated, they guide the processing of any 
subsequent information, influencing how others perceive and interpret them. If 
initial impressions elicit favorable emotions, then subsequent behavior might be 
interpreted in this light; if initial impressions elicit irritation or suspicion, this too 
will color future impressions. Such automatic processes initiate spontaneously and 
inescapably upon the individual's encountering appropriate stimulus conditions 
(you can't ignore cues within your visual field, for example), where the environ-
ment directly causes mental activity. In psychology, this has been called the 
perception-behavior link (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). 
From the Confucian standpoint, one must be mindful of how one comports 
oneself, for these actions can turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. Much of what 
determines whether an individual is willing to be cooperative, accommodating, or 
otherwise disposed to expend energy in forging relations with others will hinge on 
these first moves. Favorable first interactions are conducive to forging productive 
relationships, and vice-versa. By failing to be mindful of one's comportment and its 
effects on others, the possibility for reaching agreeable outcomes with others can be 
excluded from the outset. Ritual thus requires a degree of self-control or self-
mastery, and such metaphors are used in various parts of the Analects. For example, 
YAN Yuan .MmM [YAN Hui .M@]expresses gratitude toward Confucius, crediting 
him with enlarging himself with learning, while restraining him with the rites 
(9.11). The nobleman "studies broadly in culture, restrains himself through the 
rites, and does not overstep bounds" (6.27; cf. 12.15). Generally, those who restrain 
themselves seldom err (4.23). In a famous exchange with Yan Yuan, Confucius 
characterizes this ability to self-regulate as the core to humank.indness (ren). 
Yan Yuan asked about humankindness. The Master said, "Discipline yourself and tum to 
the rites----this leads to humankindness. If, for one day, you discipline yourself and tum to 
the rites, the world would tum toward humankindness as well. Humankindness is in you-
how could it come from others?" Yan Yuan asked, "I beg you for some details." The Master 
said, "If it's not Ii-don't look at it. If it's not Ii-don't listen to it. If it's not Ii-don't speak 
of it. If it's not Ii-don't act on it." (12.1) 
Ritual decorum does require some individual creativity and style. Within the 
general parameters set by the Ii there would be considerable room for personal 
variation. Perhaps some forms of rituals would admit of variation to a greater 
degree than others. Hosting banquets, choosing gifts, making conversation-all of 
these would be amenable to personal appropriation and creativity. Roger Ames and 
Henry Rosemont emphasize that "full participation in a ritually-constituted com-
munity requires the personalization of prevailing customs, institutions, and values. 
What makes ritual profoundly different from law or rule is this process of making 
the tradition one's own" (Ames and Rosemont 1998: 51). 
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Nonetheless, even while emphasizing the creative and personal aspects of 
Confucian ethical conduct, Ames and Rosemont note that 
... personal refinement is only possible through the discipline provided by fonnalized roles 
and behaviors. Fonn without creative personalization is coercive and dehumanizing law; 
creative personal expression without fonn is randomness at best, and license at worst. It is 
only with the appropriate combination of form and personalization that community can be 
self-regulating and refined. (Ames and Rosemont 1998: 52) 
Indeed, Book X of the Analects is perhaps best understood as capturing just these 
peculiarities of ritual performance by Confucius himself-his ability to infuse ritual 
observance with personal style. Take, for example, Confucius asking many questions 
upon visiting the Great Ancestral Temple of the Duke of Zhou mJ ~ even while 
presumably having detailed knowledge about it himself (10.21; cf. 3.15). As Kurtis 
Hagen notes, this may be an example of Ii behavior, but it is likely not acting 
according to some stipulative rule "dictating that one has to ask lots of questions in 
the Great Ancestral Temple, or even in temples in general" (Hagen 2010). 
Rather, Confucius's conduct was ritually appropriate (10 in the sense that this was a 
situation in which being inquisitive, and genuinely acting accordingly, expressed a proper 
sense-of-ritual. More generally, the point could be that one has to be deferential when one is 
in unfamiliar surroundings. (Hagen 2010: 7) 
Edward Slingerland makes a similar point, arguing that the most straightforward 
meaning of this anecdote is that comporting oneself according to the Ii demands that 
"one ask polite questions upon entering someone else's ancestral temple, or that one 
not display one's superior knowledge of ritual" (Slingerland 2003: 23). 
Ritual Mastery 
While such metaphors of self-restraint and personal effort are key aspects of ritual 
behavior, the Analects maintains that through devoted practice one can develop a 
capacity to observe the Ii in an effortless fashion. Indeed, the wonderfully terse 
autobiography of Confucius in Analects 2.4 suggests that after a prolonged period 
(55 years) of study and self-cultivation, Confucius himself had achieved a state of 
advanced virtuosity, allowing him to assent to his emotional prompts without 
hesitation and without encountering friction or resistance by others: 
The Master said: At fifteen I set my heart on learning; At thirty I took my position 
[in society]; At forty I had no doubts; At fifty I understood the commands of Heaven; At 
sixty my ears were attuned; At seventy I could follow my heart's desires without 
transgressing norms. 
This passage represents a kind of regulative ideal that mastery of the li is meant to 
facilitate. The passage states that Confucius set his mind on a course of study or 
cultivation at the age of 15, and pursued it for a span of 55 years. While rituals are 
not mentioned here explicitly, we can assume that they would constitute a large part 
of the formal learning during this time span. After such extensive study, Confucius 
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was able to cultivate a state of being such that he could follow his immediate 
inclinations in all of life's predicaments without transgressing social norms. 
A number of attempts have been made to account for this type of virtuosity. 
Chenyang Li has advanced a metaphorical interpretation of Ii as cultural gram-
mar, and hence ritual mastery as mastery of a cultural grammar (Li 2007). Just as 
grammar or syntax provides rules regulating the construction of sentences and 
phrases, ritual propriety can be understood as providing the rules governing all 
forms of ethical, social, and political norms of behavior. They provide the basic 
rules and norms of human behavior in society: 
According to the interpretation I present here, a culture is analogous to a language, a person 
in general observance of Ii in a culture is analogous to someone who follows the grammar 
of a language that he or she speaks, and a person of ren is analogous to someone who has 
mastered a language (Li 2007: 317). 
Li extends this analogy in a number of ways. Children have to be taught the rules of 
grammar and so too must they be taught the rules of propriety. One way of doing 
both is through imitation or rote memorization. Studying grammar is necessary for 
linguistic competence, and studying Ii is necessary for cultural competence. 
Grammars are relatively stable yet also admit to changes, as do the Ii: 
We usually do not learn Ii in abstract forms, nor do we usually learn grammar in abstract 
forms. One becomes proficient in practicing Ii by following patterns of human activity in 
daily life, as one becomes grammatically proficient by using linguistic patterns. Although a 
person who has become skillful in performing Ii does not have to think about it all the 
time----one can act naturally in accordance with Ii-when someone does not behave 
appropriately, we will quickly notice that he or she violates some rules of Ii (Li 2007: 318). 
Similarly, Karen Lai has claimed that the mature, skilled moral exemplar 
does not view the behavioral requirements embodied in Ii as constraints on his behavior. Li 
are no longer cumbersome and restrictive. But they are indispensable because they create 
the conditions for appropriate expressions of the self ... the expression of attitudes, inten-
tion, and emotion within the boundaries of meaningful action (Lai 2006: 76). 
At this point, observance of Ii proceeds forth from an internalized sense of it, and 
not a conscious application of it. Sarkissian has drawn from research in neurosci-
ence to suggest how prolonged ritual performance might facilitate such effortless 
behavior through an accumulation of somatic markers that might expedite effortless 
navigation through social life (Sarkissian 2010a). Social experience provides 
individuals with a diverse repertoire of mental images that are triggered when 
one encounters new situations analogous to those previously experienced. These 
images will be tuned to the relevant situation type, and will be marked with a certain 
feel or emotional valence, attracting one to certain types of behaviors while 
distancing one from others. These images thus serve as emotional markers that 
work as a kind of 'biasing device', limiting the extent to which a person will need to 
consider or reason through the demands of the current situation: 
The accrual of these markers over time fine-tunes and accelerates the decision-making 
process; at the limit, the correct course of action would come to mind immediately, with 
compelling emotional valence. . . familiarity with a broad range of emotions, facilitated 
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through exposure to literature, art, and social rituals, will allow one to perceive values in a 
wide range of scenarios, thus improving the likelihood of responding appropriately in any 
particular situation (Sarkissian 2010a: 7). 
In accounting for the effortless ease of such exemplars, it is important to keep in mind 
the efficacy of rituals themselves. Rituals can be conceived as social scripts with 
predetennined sequences of actions. Thus, rituals would have an efficacy of their 
own that would be prompted by the correct invocation of a ritual form-for example, a 
greeting such as a bow. This would, under normal circwnstances, lead to automatic and 
therefore predictable reciprocation in others. According to Fingarette, what is distinc-
tive about ritual or ceremonial acts is the way they effortlessly steer social intercourse; 
in the appropriate setting, all that is needed is an initial ritual gesture, and everything 
else 'just happens' (Fingarette 1972: 8). Fingarette points out that in a "well-learned 
ceremony, each person does what he is supposed to do according to a pattern. My 
gestures are coordinated hannoniously with yours---though neither of us has to force, 
push, demand, compel, or otherwise 'make' this happen"; "the truly ceremonial 'takes 
place'; there is a kind of spontaneity. It happens 'of itself"' (Fingarette 1972: 9). These 
features are what lead Fingarette to characterize the Ii as 'magical'. 
Given their mastery, the junzi would be able to invoke the correct ritual gestures 
and avail themselves to its efficacy, triggering patterns of response and reciproca-
tion in an effortless fashion. As A.C. Graham has noted, 
The ritual act, influencing through interrelations which the agents do not analyse, does have 
an efficacy different in kind from the act calculated as means to an end. The man of Potency 
[de] who has, not an abstract knowledge of conventions, but an effortless skill and grace in 
operating with them, although 'doing nothing', does enhance the order around him. 
(Graham 1989: 25) 
Deploying the right rituals therefore helps us get a grip on the 'magical' ability of 
virtuous exemplars such as Confucius at 70. 
Ritual Government 
We have noted that the rituals originally referred to the rites and ceremonies of the 
clan royalty. They were observed on important occasions throughout the year and 
were part of the core religious practices of court life, including sacrifices to 
ancestors. This might suggest that rituals were a distinct part of court life 
disassociated from other, more mundane aspects of rulership or governance. How-
ever, this would be highly misleading. In the Analects, ritual is often described as 
constitutive of a good or ideal form of government. For example, while 
commenting on how to guide or lead (dao :it!) the people, Confucius claims that 
the proper way to regulate them is through ritual: 
Confucius said, "Guide them with government, order them with punishments, and the 
people will become evasive and have no sense of shame. Guide them with virtuous 
charisma, order them with ritual, and the people will feel ashamed and pattern themselves 
to the good" (2.3). 
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Here, Confucius contrasts two different systems of guiding or leading society. On 
the one hand, one could make extensive use of laws and punishments to delineate 
the norms of proper and improper conduct and spur the people along to socially 
desirable behavior. The use of laws and punishments were prevalent during 
Confucius's time, and were considered by many to be appropriate means to order 
the populace during a time of increasing population, greater social mobility, and 
more centralization of political and military power. As the ruling class was engaged 
in constant infighting, and ambitious, upwardly mobile peasants vied with existing 
members of the social elite for positions of power and influence, traditional clan-
based forms of governance were being overturned. In tumultuous times, many 
thinkers saw an increasing need for objective and explicit laws and standards to 
properly regulate social behavior. Such laws and standards were promulgated on 
bamboo strips and bronze vessels and were seen as important tools of governance: 
they could be applied universally to all individuals regardless of their hereditary or 
social background; they would be clear and unambiguous; and they would be 
backed by strict punishments to insure their efficacy. During a time of social and 
political turmoil, the use of laws and punishments had widespread appeal. 
Yet the early Confucians recorded in the Analects rejected these notions. From 
their perspective, such forms of regulation and guidance were exceedingly poor. 
There were several reasons why Confucians rejected penal law and advocated the Ii 
as the core component of their political vision. First, the use of laws and 
punishments was thought to lead to undesirable behavioral consequences among 
the commoners. Faced with the fear of being punished people will simply do all 
they can to evade them. But this provides no real leadership or guidance. A set of 
prohibitions outlawing certain actions will fail to advance laudable or ideal forms of 
conduct. Worse still, explicit laws will promote a practice of disputation and 
litigation. If such laws are to be applied to any particular instance of conduct it 
will require interpretation, hence individuals will resort to disputation and litigation 
in order to advance their own interpretations and avoid punitive consequences. This 
generates sophistry, glib or clever talk, and a general inclination toward self-
interested and evasive behavior, seeking exceptions for oneself rather than confor-
mity to a shared purpose (Hansen 1993: 64-65). Confucius tells YAN Yuan that he is 
as capable of handling litigation as anyone else, but what is necessary is to create a 
state of affairs where litigations is non-existent (12.13). Sor-hoon Tan observes that 
from the Confucian perspective, "laws are at best necessary evils. At their worst, 
laws undennine efforts at achieving a polity of virtuous people" (Tan 2011 : 470).5 
As an alternative, Confucius recommends guiding the people through observing 
rituals. What could this mean? How could one govern through observing the rites? 
It may not seem obvious, but once we take into account a widely shared assumption 
s Additionally (and more prosaically) any increase in the use of penal law would pose a direct 
threat to the power and authority of the Confucians themselves. As experts of Ii their livelihood 
depended on its perpetuation. If government turned to penal law, what need would there be to 
consult the Confucians? 
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found throughout the early Chinese corpus-namely, that people will naturally 
emulate or imitate those above them in the social hierarchy as a principal way of 
learning and adopting new behaviors (see, e.g., Munro 1969}-the role of ritual will 
be easier to understand. Such emulation can occur either actively or passively: 
actively, individuals might choose to imitate others out of a desire to exemplify the 
admirable qualities they possess; passively, an individual might mimic the behavior 
of others not out of any conscious desire or intention but simply through being 
exposed to their example repeatedly. Either way, the widespread belief among 
thinkers of this time was that individuals are influenced by their environments, and 
will behave quite differently depending upon what models they are presented with. 
Thus, when JI Kangzi *J.jt-=f (one of the heads of the Ji family of Confucius's 
home state of Lu) asks Confucius about governing, Confucius replies, "If you were 
not so covetous yourself your people would not steal--even if you rewarded them 
for it" (12.18), and that if JI Kangzi took the lead in correcting his comportment, no 
one would dare do otherwise (12.17; cf. 12.22). 
The Analects was compiled during a period of great upheaval and social unrest. 
According to the psychological model just sketched, much of this unrest could be 
attributed to bad role models among the elites; poor behavior among the people 
reflects poor behavior among the ruling class. Thus, properly guiding the population 
must begin by reforming the behavior of the elites of society. The ruling class 
embraces ritual propriety and the people become reverent (13.4) and easily enlisted 
into service (14.41). Ruling with ritual is ruling without difficulty (4.13). This is a 
form of virtue politics-the idea that bringing about a state of harmony and order in 
the general population requires virtuous individuals in positions of power who, 
through the excellence of their character and moral example, influence others 
toward moral goodness. Indeed, the Analects places so much emphasis on the 
role of virtue in government that it is easy to characterize their entire political 
vision as hinging upon it. A virtuous and charismatic ruler, in particular, was 
believed capable of transforming the entire world by sheer power of his de ffi-
the charismatic influence of his moral example: 
The master said, "One who governs by means of his de is comparable to the Pole Star, 
which occupies its place and receives the homage of the myriad lesser stars" (2.1). 
The master said, "Majestic! Shun 1f and Yu 11; 6 possessed the whole world without 
even managing it" (8.18). 
The master said, "Someone who ruled without even acting (wuwei ~~}-was this not 
Shun? What did he do? He made himself reverent and took his proper position facing 
south-that is all!" (15.5). 
The Confucians had some reason to believe in this. After all, according to their basic 
psychological model, people emulate those above them in the social hierarchy. If the 
kingpin of the system-the ruler-were to comport himself in a virtuous manner then 
the emulation could continue down through the ranks of ministers, officials, village 
leaders, et.c., creating a linked chain of virtuous behavior throughout the land. This 
6 Mythical heroes and sage-rulers of antiquity, venerated by the Confucian and Mohist schools. 
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would allow the ruler to govern 'effortlessly '-by just sitting on the throne ( as it were). 
In the words of Bruce and Taeko Brooks, "if the ruler has the right qualities, those 
below will spontaneously acquire those qualities. We might call this the assent of the 
governed; their capacity to respond to good influence" (Brooks and Brooks 1998: 94). 
Governing by Ii, then, is governing without resorting to threats of violence. 
Indeed, laws and litigation will be unnecessary (12.13). Ritual is thus associated 
with an exemplary form of government whereby people are made pliant, obedient, 
and willing to serve. Having been presented with inspiring and admirable behavior 
from those above, the people will be ashamed of acting poorly, and will naturally 
tum toward the good. In these ways, the ruling class would, through manifesting the 
excellence of the moral traditions as captured in the Ii, elicit paradigmatic responses 
from the rest of the population, engendering feelings of admiration, fondness, and 
gratitude in them. Once these further psychological assumptions are made apparent, 
and as one keeps in mind the hierarchical, clan-based social political system that 
was practiced during Confucius's time, the Confucian notion of ruling by ritual 
gains some degree of plausibility. 
Ritual propriety also applied to diplomatic relations, including state visits, banquets, 
signing of treaties, and ways of accommodating foreign visitors. In each of these 
strategic and potentially risky situations, the Ii provided guidelines meant to facilitate 
positive interactions. The importance of maintaining the Ii at the interpersonal level 
thus finds an analogue at the international level. As David Wong notes, in political 
negotiation, when one is trying to navigate a course between conflicting values, norms, 
and ends, agreement in practice will oftentimes be difficult to secure ( even when 
agreement in theory seems possible), because "the process of coming to agreement 
presupposes a willingness to listen, to consider and to give weight to the other 
participants' views. This willingness depends on a significant degree of mutual respect 
that may not be possible without the ritual" (Wong 2000: 209). Members of the 
government at all ranks are routinely enlisted to negotiate difficult issues, not only 
within their own jurisdictions but also with foreign dignitaries as well. During such 
strategic encounters it would be paramount to allow for negotiations to proceed 
amicably so that mutually agreeable outcomes can be secured on a peaceful and 
reasoned basis. As William Haines puts it, "cooperation without coercion needs mutual 
confidence and an agreed plan. In the visible coordinations of ritual we refresh and 
observe our shared sense of the attractions of harmony, renewing our confidence in our 
mutual commitment" (Haines 2008: 474). This would be especially important when 
the individuals might occupy different ranks or social stations, where inequalities 
between individuals can be recast as a "shared adherence to a stable common way 
rather than a conflict of interest that threatens both parties" (Haines 2008: 474). 
Political discourse during Confucius's time had eroded considerably, and kings 
and feudal lords were often more content to settle their differences through warfare 
rather than diplomacy. ('This was, after all, the beginning of the Warring States 
(Zhanguo till) period (453-221 B.C.E.) of Chinese antiquity.) In such a rancorous 
political environment, observing proper ritual protocols would maximize the poten-
tial at forging fruitful cooperative endeavors that might otherwise be derailed if 
individuals are not encouraged to trust or feel well disposed toward one another. 
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Rituals and Flexibility 
Confucius and those in his circle reveal not only a detailed knowledge of ritual, but 
also a strong aversion to deviation from received ritual forms. In the Analects, ritual 
conservatism is the norm. Conservatism is so prevalent that the sole instance where 
Confucius accepts a departure from received tradition is noteworthy. This is his 
approval of a change from hemp hats to silk hats as part of ceremonial garb (9.3). 
The reason seems to be that such a deviation does not detract from the meaning or 
substance of the ceremony, and instead reflects practical considerations.7 Even 
here, where Confucius seems to approve of a change in ritual, one should be very 
cautious to draw any general tendency toward flexibility. First, Confucius is 
approving an existing modification of the rites, and not initiating a change himself. 
Second, the change seems very trivial. During a time when ritual observance was 
declining, this would not be the place to pick a fight. Third, in the very same passage 
he rejects another existing modification-bowing on top of the stairs of the royal 
temple, not below-because this signals arrogance; in the apt words of Brooks and 
Brooks, "the 'below' option implies asking permission to ascend; the 'above' 
presumes it" (Brooks and Brooks 1998: 51). 
This passage suggests that the conservatism toward Ii is tied importantly to its 
general function. If the Ii are to have meaning and efficacy they must remain relatively 
stable across time and must express values and commitments in a clear, unambiguous 
way. "The power of communally accepted forms of cultural expression to shape and 
guide behavior largely hinges upon their communal acceptance. It is only under very 
specific conditions that traditional rituals can be changed without significantly 
dissipating this power'' (Wilson 1995: 274). Such dissipation in power of ritual can 
be understood as threatening communal well-being and social coordination, leading to 
fragmentation. As Stephen Wilson notes, ritual 'liberalism' (as it were) would have 
dire consequences for the individual who wishes to originate new ritual forms: 
Taking a public ritual like hand-shaking and deciding that for oneself it will dignify 
hostility and ill will rather than greeting of friendship. . . has two serious consequences 
for one's flourishing. First, it all but guarantees that no one will understand what one is 
seeking to convey in such a gesture ... 
A second consequence of substantially altering public rituals to fit one's private 
specifications is even more significant-to turn one's back on much of what one's culture 
deems human is to turn one's back on any possibility of a fully human life in that 
community (Wilson 1995: 274). 
On this reading, we can understand the importance of ritual stability apart from the 
content of any particular ritual tradition. Ishani Maitra has made similar comments 
about other meaning-bearing ritual practices, such as rules of etiquette. Rules of 
7 One might wonder how silk is more practical than hemp. Brooks and Brooks comment that 
production of silk is difficult and that its prevalence has deep political significance. "Silk is labor-
intensive, monopolizing rural women at weaving time and rural families at silkworm-tending time; 
it implies an above-subsistence agriculture and a systematic platooning of the rural populace" 
(Brooks and Brooks 1998: 51 ). 
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etiquette must be elaborate and wide-ranging, but the end of social cohesiveness 
relies more on their stability than their particular form: 
[T]o realize the characteristic end of etiquette, there must be in place rules of etiquette 
governing a range of social interactions. But notice that, to realize this end, what is needed is 
some set of rules or other. Social cohesiveness would be equally well served by any nwnber 
of alternate sets of rules (perhaps within some limits). In this sense, rules of etiquette are 
arbitrary. Moreover, they are generally perceived as such. Insofar as we participate in the 
practice because we value the end of social cohesiveness, this perceived arbitrariness need not 
undennine our willingness to abide by these rules (Maitra 2004: 200--201). 
Of course, Confucius would likely disagree that there was anything arbitrary about 
the beauty of the Zhou rituals, but from our own perspective such considerations 
help explain the ritual conservatism that is so prominent in the text. 
Finally, we might infer that for Confucius there was simply no other comparable 
standard available, no other culture or tradition, to match that of the waning Zhou 
dynasty. Without any serious competitors, maintaining the integrity of received 
ritual forms would be paramount. Confucius did not select the Ii from a rich 
marketplace of options. Rather, the choice for him seemed to have been to follow 
the Ii of the Zhou or to abandon them for clearly inferior forms of social arrange-
ment, such as the use of laws and punishments. Hence, the conservatism might 
reflect, at a more basic level, a desire to foster the only real hope for a flourishing, 
harmonious world. Fingarette has championed this view. On his reading, Confucius 
''never once entertains" the possibility of conflicts of value, culture, and custom of 
which we are so aware (Fingarette 1972: 57). Confucius seems aware only of a Ii 
that has been passed down through the ages, and that has its seat in his own state of 
Lu. For Confucius, "there is no genuine option: either one follows the Way or one 
fails" (Fingarette 1972: 21). 
Yi~ or Rightness 
The li seem to permeate all aspects of the Analects. They provide norms of conduct 
within the family and among social relations. They constitute the basis for proper 
government. They are tied to important religious practices and conventions. And 
they capture the best wisdom passed down through ancestral lines until the present. 
The Ii are the first thing one ought to consider when trying to exemplify the highest 
standards of human excellence (12.1). As D.C. Lau puts it, "the rites were a body of 
rules governing action in every aspect of life in the word repository of past insights 
into morality. It is, therefore, important that one should, unless there are strong 
reasons to the contrary, observe them" (Lau 1979: 20). Following the Ii is obviously 
paramount from the Confucian perspective. 
However, while the Ii were extensive, and while one could spend a lifetime trying 
to master them, they fell short of covering every conceivable life situation. First, the Ii 
were most obviously applicable in certain settings and situation types-formal 
occasions such as meals, social and political gatherings, athletic competitions, and 
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religious ceremonies. In these stable, repeating situation types, individual duties and 
demands would be explicitly delineated and readily available through consulting the 
requisite texts and experts. Apart from such situations, the li would also dictate, in a 
general way, matters of etiquette and comportment that would apply to individuals 
occupying certain roles. For example, the Ii attending to individuals in their roles as 
hosts or guests would have broad applicability across a range of occasions. Second, 
there would always be cases of conflict, where more than one rule of Ii would seem to 
be applicable. For example, as we noted above, the Ii of filial piety requires a son to 
maintain a deferential attitude towards his father; however, he may also dissent if his 
father deviates from proper conduct (4.18). But when is it appropriate to dissent? In 
what manner? Should the son keep the matter to himself? The answers to such 
questions are not provided by the Ii themselves. Take, as another example, the 
injunction to avoid lengthy trips abroad when possible (4.19). While one might 
follow this as a rule, there may be occasions that seem to warrant such lengthy 
trips. When is it acceptable to leave one's family for an extended period? What types 
of reasons would justify the violation of this norm of conduct?8 These questions 
admit of no easy answers. Nonetheless, in spite of there being no Ii (perhaps one 
would say meta-Ii at this point) to guide one in these instances, an exemplary person 
must continue to act in a way that exemplifies the spirit of ritual propriety, even if this 
entails acting contrary to ritual propriety (Ivanhoe 2000: 2). 
It is in these situation types, where there is no standard li applicable to one's 
situation, that the notion of yi or rightness plays such a crucial role within early 
Confucian deliberations of ethical conduct. As Benjamin Schwartz puts it, yi 
denotes appropriate behavior "in the vast sea of unique life situations where more 
often than not there is no simple 'covering' rule ofli" (Schwartz 1985: 79). As with 
many other normative concepts in the Analects, rightness (yi) is a quality associated 
with morally exemplary persons. Confucius extols his disciple Zizhang f5R to 
continuously follow or move towards what is right (12.10) and tells Zilu rlil& that 
the nobleman puts rightness as his highest priority (16.23). This exaltation of 
rightness appears elsewhere as well. For example, we are told that the nobleman 
is neither for or against anything save what is right, which he follows invariably 
(4.10). Similarly, Confucius says that "the nobleman takes rightness as essential, 
enacts it by means of ritual propriety, brings it forth through modesty, and 
completes it with sincerity," suggesting that rightness has primacy amongst these 
various virtuous qualities (15.18). 
The concept of rightness is often tokened in contexts where the nobleman might 
compromise himself owing to desires for profit or fame. Confucius states that riches 
and honors by means of what is not right were nothing to him (7.16), and tells Zilu 
that in order to become a perfected person one need have three qualities, one of 
which is thinking of rightness when seeing an opportunity for gain (14.12; cf 19.1). 
We are told that the nobleman converses about what is right, as opposed to the petty 
8 An edifying discussion of these issues having to do with tensions in discharging filial duty can be 
found in Elstein 2009. 
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person who only speaks of profit (4.16), and that the petty person will seek profit 
through robbery because his boldness is not tempered by a sense of what is right 
(17.23). In 16.10, Confucius outlines nine things that the nobleman focuses on, 
ending with the comment that the nobleman thinks of rightness when he sees an 
opportunity for acquisition. In 16.23, we are told that petty people who have the 
quality of being daring yet lack a sense of what is right will end up committing 
robbery. Finally, Confucius contrasts having notoriety or fame with being distin-
guished, which can only be secured through rightness (12.29). 
We might clarify the relationship between ritual and rightness in a number of 
ways. Rituals seem to govern strictures of conduct on certain types of occasions and 
for individuals occupying certain roles. Thus, rituals can be known or stipulated in 
advance. Rightness, by contrast, seems largely to do with those life situations where 
one lacks an obvious rule of propriety that one could follow, yet nonetheless must 
exemplify the high standards of personal excellence that is embodied in the Ii. It 
should now perhaps be apparent that rightness is most often a quality or property of 
actions and not persons. In the words of D. C. Lau, "rightness is basically a 
character of acts and its application to agents is derivative. A man is righteous 
only in so far as he consistently does what is right" (Lau 1979: 27). This entails that 
rightness is highly situation-specific or particularistic in character. 
A pressing question remains: how does the nobleman know which action is yi 
and which is not? If there is no default Ii script, how does the nobleman know how 
to proceed? Some have characterized it as a situation-specific practical judgment. 
Tu Wei-Ming tt~im. for example, describes yi as "a practical judgment based 
upon a holistic evaluation of objective conditions. The man of righteousness (yi), 
unlike the man of profit, is resolved to be just in an equitable and open way" 
(Tu 1981: 52). But how to do so? There are places in the Analects where Confucius 
advocates the use of a kind of analogical reasoning. Consider, for example, his 
injunction of the 'negative golden rule' or 'silver rule'---do not do to others what 
you yourself would not desire (12.2)-and the virtue of reciprocity (shu "1m. 4.15, 
5.24). We should not treat others in ways that we ourselves would object to if the 
tables were turned. This injunction is given famous formulation in the following 
central passage of the Analects: 
Zizhang asked "Is there a single word that might serve a guide for one's entire life?" The 
Master said, "Wouldn't that be 'understanding' [shu f&]? What you do not desire, do not 
impose on others" (15.24; c.f. 5.12, 6.30). 
Shu refers to an ability to see the similarities between individuals, to view others as 
one would view oneself, and to extend to others a sympathetic understanding that 
one naturally has toward oneself. Elsewhere, Zigong r J{ asks Confucius about 
humankindness, and in answering this question Confucius says that those who 
possess humankindness take "what is near at hand"-namely, themselves-as an 
analogy when thinking of others (6.30). If we think of these passages alongside the 
general injunction to think of rightness when tempted by profit or fame, it seems as 
though analogical reasoning might be especially useful in situations that lack an 
obvious Ii imperative: when tempted by personal gain or benefit, think of how this 
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would affect others, and do not act in ways that you yourself would find objection-
able. Those who reason in such a fashion might thereby enhance their abilities to 
choose actions that are yi. In Ivanhoe's words, shu 
... helps one avoid becoming a slave to the li. It insures that individuals will have an active 
sense of their co-humanity with others. It guarantees that people will run the rules and not 
be run by the rules. One is to see oneself as dedicated to serving others according to the 
rituals, but one is also to see oneself as responsible for the well-being of others (Ivanhoe 
1990: 128). 
Apart from such models relying upon practical reasoning of one kind or another, 
there are other proposals that rest upon a more basic, intuitive faculty that accrues to 
individuals who have observed ritual propriety and dedicated themselves to exem-
plary conduct. For example, Joel Kupperman believes Confucius requires the 
virtuous agent to "gravitate" to the appropriate action; "what he 'feels like' doing 
is what is right" (Kupperman 1968: 184). Similarly, Philip Ivanhoe calls it an 
"intuitive sense of the Way" (Ivanhoe 2000: 1), and attributes some of this intuitive 
sense as resulting from prior ritual practice. "Rituals ... guide one to develop a 
sense for what is right. This sense is necessary for a refined understanding of ritual. 
One develops this sense by continually reflecting upon the ultimate goal of ritual, 
the harmonious functioning of a society of human beings" (Ivanhoe 1990: 24). 
Though this comment is about proper execution of ritual, similar considerations 
would explain the sources of yi in the Analects. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames 
have also put forth such an interpretation, arguing that 
. . . actions that realize yi are not perf onned in accordance with strict guidelines. Such 
actions are, at least to some degree, spontaneous, novel, and creative .... The articulation of 
yi with respect to a given situation involves the emerging awareness of what is or is not 
appropriate in that situation and how one might act so as to realize this appropriateness in its 
highest degree (Hall and Ames 1987: 102). 
Conclusion: Li, Yi, and Harmony 
The first appearance of Ii in the Analects occurs in 1.12, where Youzi flT makes 
the following statement: 
When it comes to the practice of ritual, the harmony is what is valued. That was the beauty 
of the dao of the Fonner Sages, why great and small all followed it. There was something 
they did not practice-namely, knowing the value of harmony and going straight for it. If 
you don't restrain the practice with ritual propriety, that too is unacceptable. 
Out of all the statements concerning ritual in the Analects, this one is perhaps the 
most appropriate as a summarizing position. It articulates many of the aspects of the 
Ii noted above: The Ii were valued, above all, because when practiced they effected 
harmony throughout the world. The importance of Ii is ultimately underscored 
because of its crucial-and irreplaceable-role in fostering social harmony. The 
word harmony (he *1) seldom appears in the text, but harmony is the regulative 
ideal which most of the teachings of the Analects were meant to bring about. 
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Hannony is a state in which each person exemplifies the virtues that obtain to them 
within their particular place in society. In exemplifying these virtues they hanno-
nize with others. 
There is great beauty in this Confucian vision of a society in which each person 
exemplifies the excellences of their particular roles and lives in hannonious union 
with others. According to Chenyang Li, hannony "presupposes the existence of 
different things and implies a certain favorable relationship among them," and 
"a hannonious relationship presupposes that [the individuals] have different 
perspectives and different views on various issues" (Li 2006: 584, 586). Confucius 
claims that an exemplary person "hannonizes and does not seek mere agreement," 
whereas a petty person "agrees but does not hannonize" (13.23). Li expands on this 
passage: 
For Confucius, a sensible person should be able to respect different opinions and be able to 
work with different people in a harmonious way. A major function of Ii fl (rites, rituals of 
propriety) is precisely to harmonize people of various kinds ... Confucius and Confucians 
see a direct connection between Ii and he. They take Ii to be a central aspect of government 
and believe that through the good use of Ii, good government results in a harmonious 
society (Li 2006: 586--587). 
Hannony relies upon attitudes of trust and goodwill, of community and shared 
purpose, that cannot be brought forward at whim; they must be cultivated. Rituals 
"foster a common bond between the living participants, a sense of community that 
is rooted in the past and stretches onward into the future" (Wong 2000: 209). We've 
noted throughout that the Ii are central to developing social and moral virtues such 
as humankindness, filial devotion, and reverence. These attitudes are crucial to 
facilitating hannony; without them, harmony is not in the offing. As Wong puts it, 
"One reason why harmony cannot be sought for its own sake is that aiming directly 
at hannony lacks the power of summoning forth attitudes that may be shaped into 
mutual respect between the participants" (Wong 2000: 209). These attitudes can 
best be instilled through shared practices; the Ii constitute such shared practices. 
Ultimately, then, the Ii are tied directly to the most central value Confucians 
recognize-living in a harmonious world-and yi helps insure that one does so in the 
situations where one's commitment to this goal might be most strongly compromised. 
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